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SUNSHINE IN INDIAN COUNTRY: A PRO-FOIA VIEW OF
KLAMATH WATER USERS
Sean Hill*

I. Introduction
In U.S. Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective
Ass'n,' the U.S. Supreme Court examined the application of the Federal
Freedom of Information Ace (FOIA) and its exemption for interagency and
intra-agency communications to documents passing between Indian tribes and
the Department of the Interior. The Court determined, for reasons to be
discussed in greater detail below, that the documents were not exempt from
disclosure as they were not inter- or intra-agency documents under any
reasonable reading of the statute.3
This note will discuss why the Supreme Court was correct in finding that
the exemption did not apply to the documents in question, despite concerns by
some that allowing access to this information would hinder the federal-tribal
relationship and the duties owed Indian tribes by the United States. This note
will examine the policy behind FOIA, the policy behind the exemption for
inter- and intra-agency documents, and the policy and impact of the federaltribal trust relationship.
II. US. Department of the Interiorv. Klamath Water Users ProtectiveAss 'n
This action arose after the Klamath Water Users Protective Association
requested FOIA access to documents generated and passed between the
government and several tribes during two water-rights proceedings. One of
the proceedings took place in the Department's Bureau of Reclamation and the
other was adjudicated in the state courts of Oregon.' Before addressing the
proceedings and the specific documents at issue in Klamath Water Users, it is
first important to understand and identify the parties involved not only in this
FOIA action before the U.S. Supreme Court, but also, to some limited extent,
the parties involved in the two proceedings giving rise to this action.
*
1.
2.
3.
4.

Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
532 U.S. 1(2001).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
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A. The Parties
Parties to this FOIA action include the Klamath Water Users Protective
Association and several entities of the federal government. Several tribes,
including the Klamath Indian Tribe, were parties to the underlying disputes
leading to this action.
The government agencies involved in this litigation include the U.S.
Department of the Interior, the Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),
and the Department's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). In addition to
being the "nation's principal conservation agency," the Department is charged
with managing Indian lands and resources.' Much of the responsibility for
managing Indian trust lands and natural resources is delegated to the BIA.6
The BIA is the arm of the Department that is primarily charged with
performing the government's duties within its trust relationship with Indian
tribes.7 The BIA's duties include managing tribal lands and resources, which
includes management of tribal water rights!8 One common complaint about
the BIA, and one that is arguably present in Klamath Water Users, is the everpresent conflicts between the BIA and other units of the Department.9 For
instance, "Indian land and water interests frequently conflict with the activities
or designs of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of Land Management, the
National Park Service and, occasionally, the Bureau of Mines and the Office
of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement."' 0 Each of these groups,
however, is located within the Department." The Bureau of Reclamation
focuses its efforts on protecting and managing the nation's water resources.'"
Among its services, Reclamation provides irrigation water for farmers and
operates hydroelectric power plants throughout the United4 States.13 It is also
the largest wholesale water supplier in the United States.'

5. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, About the Department of the Interior: DOI Quick Facts,
http://www.doi.gov/facts (last visited June 5, 2008).
6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7 (citing 25 U.S.C. §l(a)), Klamath Water Users,
532 U.S. 1 (No. 99-1871), 2000 WL 33979569.
7. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 46 (3d ed. 1998).

8. Id.at 47.
9. Id.
at 49.
10. Id.
11.

Id.

12. Bureau ofReclamation Facts & Information, http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/fact.html
(last visited June 5,2008).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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The Klamath Water Users Protective Association is a non-profit
organization representing its members on matters dealing with "water
resources, agriculture, and other resource issues in or affecting the Klamath
River Basin."' 5 In representing its members, the Association is a common
adversary of tribes in the area.' 6 The Klamath River Basin includes some ten
million acres in northern California and southern Oregon, including the Upper
Klamath Lake, the Klamath River, and the Klamath Reclamation Project,
which are at issue in Klamath Water Users.' 7 "Most members of the
Association have contracts with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation providing for
the delivery of water through Klamath Reclamation Project facilities for
irrigation use.' 8 Many members are public agencies.' 9 The Klamath
Reclamation Project, which is at the heart of the Bureau of Reclamation
proceeding in Klamath Water Users,2" became one of the earliest reclamation
projects in 1905.2" The project included government-financed facilities that
deliver water to arid portions of the project area.22 Those who gain access to
irrigation waters via the Klamath Reclamation Project "intensely compete for
water in a number of inter-related forums" with four tribes - the Klamath,
Yurok, Hoopa Valley, and Karuk tribes.23 Each of these tribes is involved in
the Bureau of Reclamation dispute, which specifically is related to a long-term
plan for the Klamath Project.24 Only the Klamath Indian Tribe is involved in
the Oregon water-rights adjudication. 25 Because of its prominence in the
litigation leading to this FOIA action, a look at the Klamath Indian Tribe is
worthwhile.
The Klamath Indian Tribe is a small tribe in southern Oregon and northern
California.26 The tribe was originally "divided into about seven autonomous

15. Brief for Respondent Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n at 1-2, U.S. Dep't of the
Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 99-1871), 2000 WL
1845944.
16. Id.at 3.
17. Id.at2n.1.
18. Id.at 1.
19. Id.
20. U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 5
(2001).
21. Brief for Respondent Klamath Water Users Protective Association, supra note 15, at
2.
22. Id.
23. Id.at 3.
24. Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 5.

25. Id.
26. BARBARA A. LEITCH, A CONCISE DICTIONARY OF INDIAN TRIBES OF NORTH AMERICA
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tribelets, with a common dialect and culture."2 7 The tribe signed a treaty with
the United States in 1864, leaving it with a reservation near the Upper Klamath
Lake. 2' The tribe lost its reservation lands when it was terminated in 1954,
although the tribe maintained its hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. 29 The
tribe was restored as a federally recognized tribe in 1986.30 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the hunting and fishing rights
reserved to the Klamath in the 1864 treaty implicitly reserved water rights in
an amount sufficient to exercise explicitly recognized hunting and fishing
rights.3' The Adair court also held that the right reserved by the Klamath
"consists of the right to prevent other appropriators from depleting the
streams' waters below a 32protected level in any area where the nonconsumptive right applies.
Perhaps more important to an understanding of the issues in this case than
the identities of the parties is an understanding of the underlying disputes that
produced the seven documents giving rise to this FOIA action.
B. The UnderlyingDisputes
This case developed out of requests for documents that were generated and
passed between tribes and the federal government during the two
aforementioned water-rights proceedings. These disputes, one being in the
Bureau of Reclamation and the other in Oregon state courts, 33 are examined
below.
The Bureau of Reclamation proceeding involves long-term planning for the
Klamath Irrigation Project. The project "uses water from the Klamath River
Basin to irrigate territory in Klamath County, Oregon, and two northern
California counties. '34 The Department began a long-term operations plan for
the project in 1995, with the goal of allocating water among competing water
users. 35 The Klamath, Hoopa Valley, Karuk, and Yurok tribes were all asked
by the Department to consult with the Bureau of Reclamation regarding the

224 (1979).
27. Id.
28. Id.; CARLWALDMAN,ENCYCLOPEDIAOFNATIVEAMERICANTRIBES 134 (3d ed. 2006).
29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 9 n.2.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 8-9 (citing United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1415 (9th Cir. 1984)).
32. Id. at 9.
33. U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 5
(2001).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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plans.36 In doing so, the Department entered into a "memorandum of
understanding" with the tribes in which it "recognized that '[t]he United States
Government has a unique legal relationship with Native American tribal
governments."' 37 The Department of the Interior sought through its
consultations with the tribes to assure "that the development of the [long-term
plan] reflects the United States' trust obligations and Tribal rights."3 The
memo further recognized that the consultations were intended to assess what
impact the plan would have on the tribes' trust resources.39 Of the seven
documents at issue in Klamath Water Users, four had ties to this long-term
plan for the Klamath Irrigation Project. 0
While the Reclamation proceeding was active, the BIA filed a water-rights
claim on behalf of the Klamath Indian Tribe in the state courts of Oregon.4 '
In the course of doing so, the BIA and the tribe exchanged various documents
regarding the scope of claims that should be made on behalf of the tribe. 42 It
is important to note that "the [BIA did] not ...act as counsel for the Tribe,
' In
which [had] its own lawyers and... submitted claims on its own behalf."43
filing their claims, the U.S. government and Klamath Indian Tribe sought "the
benefit of a federal reserved water right in Upper Klamath Lake to maintain
lake elevations for the ostensible benefit of fisheries and other resources in the
the
lake." In other words, the parties to the Oregon adjudication disputed
45
species.
fish
specific
support
to
lake
the
within
needed
amount of water
C. The Documents
In the course of both proceedings, documents were generated and traded
between the parties, including between tribes and the Department.' This case
began after the Klamath Water Users Protective Association filed FOIA
requests with the Department seeking documents "provided to, or received
from, the Klamath Basin Tribes pertaining to water resources issues in the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.at 5.
Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5-6.
Brief for Respondent Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, supra note 15, at 7.
Id.at 8.
Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 4.
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Klamath River Basin."4' 7 The documents involved were primarily submitted
to the BIA by the Klamath Indian Tribe.48 Remaining in dispute at the time the
District Court in this case issued its ruling were seven documents.4 9 The
documents are described in Appendix A of the Association's brief [Appendix
A] to the U.S. Supreme Court, including Vaughn index descriptions.5" A
Vaughn index is required whenever an agency claims an exemption under
FOIA.5" The index is in the form of an affidavit and must "[furnish] the court
with enough information to determine the validity of a claimed exemption."52
The index, an itemized list of requested records, also "usually detail[s] the
author, date, number of pages, subject matter of each contested document, and
a short explanation of why the document should not be disclosed."53 In this
case, Appendix A included a document identification number, document date,
document originator and recipient, a Vaughn index description, the privilege
claimed, and which proceeding the document concerned.54
The following is a synopsis of the documents involved, according to the
submitted Vaughn Index.55
The first document on the Index was from the Klamath Tribe's Department
of Natural Resources and addressed to an individual in the BIA and to the
Office of the Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs. The seven-page document
described "legal theories concerning the water rights of the federally
recognized Indian tribes of the Klamath Basin." The government claimed
attorney work-product and deliberative process privileges, and the document
referenced the Reclamation proceeding.
The second document was sent by a BIA employee to two other BIA
employees, an attorney for the Yurok Tribe, and an attorney for the Klamath
Tribe. The one-page memo "contain[ed] views on policy the BIA could
provide to other governmental agencies concerning the obligation to protect
Indian trust assets in developing an operations plan for the Klamath Project."
The government claimed a deliberative process privilege, and the document
referenced the Reclamation proceeding.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Brief for Respondent Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, supra note 15, at 8.
Petition Writ for Certiorari, supra note 6, at 8.
Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 6.
Brief for Respondent Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, supranote 15, at app. A.
37A AM. JuR. 2D Freedom ofInformation Acts § 531 (2005).
Id.
Id.
Brief for Respondent Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, supra note 15, at app. A.
Id.
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The third document went from an attorney for the Klamath Tribe to the
BIA, and "expresses views concerning trust resources in light of the Fish and
Wildlife Service's proposal regarding listed species and the resulting
implications on lake management." The government claimed a deliberative
process privilege, while the document referenced the Reclamation proceeding.
The fourth document appears to have been sent by an attorney for the
Klamath Tribe to a regional solicitor of the Office of the Solicitor within the
Department of the Interior. The document "concern[ed] the water rights
claims being prepared on behalf of the Klamath Tribes." The government
sought attorney work-product and deliberative process privileges, and the
document referenced the Oregon proceeding.
The fifth document was sent by a representative of the Klamath Tribe to the
BIA and discussed the contents of the fourth document. The government
claimed a deliberative process privilege, and the document referenced the
Oregon proceeding.
The sixth document was sent by an attorney for the Klamath Tribe to the
BIA and concerned "the Klamath Tribes' resolution regarding the Tribes'
water right claims in the Klamath Basin Adjudication." The government
claimed a deliberative process privilege, and the document referenced the
Oregon proceeding.
The seventh and final document was sent by a representative of the Klamath
Tribe to the BIA and concerned "biological factors affecting trust resources."
The government claimed a deliberative process privilege. The document
referenced the Reclamation proceeding.
D. The Holding
Holding that FOIA's Exemption 5 did not apply to the documents in this
case, the Supreme Court announced a two-part test to be used when faced with
a claimed inter- or intra-agency exemption. The Court said that (1) the
document's source must be a government agency and (2) the document "must
fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial standards
that would govern litigation against the agency that holds it."56 Examples of
such privileges include the attorney work-product and deliberative process
privileges." In recognizing a two-pronged approach to FOIA's Exemption 5,
the Court made clear that it believed both prongs are of equal importance in

56. U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8
(2001).
57. Id.
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deciding whether the exemption applies." The Court also recognized that
some lower courts have previously applied the exemption in cases where
outside consultants have been hired to provide information or documents to
government agencies.5 9 The Court found that the Department, in arguing that
Exemption 5 should apply to documents passing between Indian tribes and the
federal govermment, "[skipped] one step, for it ignores the first condition of
Exemption 5, that the communication be 'intra-agency or inter-agency. '
The Court also distinguished this case from the outside consultant line of cases
because in those cases the outside consults were not acting on behalf of
themselves, but were rather acting on behalf of the federal government.6 "The
Tribes, on the contrary, necessarily communicate with the Bureau with their
own, albeit entirely legitimate, interests in mind." 2 The Court did not stop
there, saying that in the case of the tribes "the distinction is even sharper, in
that the Tribes are self-advocates at the expense of others seeking benefits
inadequate to satisfy everyone." '3 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court,
however, seemed to narrowly tailor its opinion, saying "the intra-agency
condition excludes, at the least, communications to or from an interested party
seeking a Government benefit at the expense of other applicants," while
refusing to address the validity of the outside consultant line of cases.6"
The government also argued, to no avail, two lines of reasoning that the
Court deemed equaled a request that an Indian-trust exemption be read into
FOIA. The government argued that not permitting protection for the
documents under Exemption 5 would hinder the trust relationship between
tribes and the federal government." Additionally, the government argued that
FOIA was intended to open to view government practices, but that it should
not be used in a manner that changes how agencies perform their duties.67 The
58. Id.at 9 ("The point is not to protect Government secrecy pure and simple, however, and
the first condition of Exemption 5 is no less important than the second; the communication must
be 'inter-agency or intra-agency.').
59. Id. at 10.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 12 n.4.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. at 15 ("Quite apart from its attempt to draw a direct analogy between tribes and
conventional consultants, the Department argues that the compelled release of the documents
would itself impair the Department's performance of a specific fiduciary obligation to protect
the confidentiality of communications with tribes.").
67. Id.
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Court refused to accept these arguments, finding that they were nothing more
than an attempt to have the Court create an Indian-trust exemption.68 In
support of its position, the Court noted that Congress had twice considered,
and rejected, proposed legislation that would have provided statutory
protection to documents passing between tribes and the federal government. 9
III. The Freedom of InformationAct
Today's Freedom of Information Act began as an amendment to Section 3
of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.70 A push to amend the section
began in the 1950s when "newspapermen, legislators, and other Government
officials were concerned about the mushrooming growth of Government
secrecy.",71 Setting the tone for the overhaul of the public information law then
in effect, the senator introducing the bill borrowed the words of James
Madison, who had assisted in drafting the First Amendment:
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean
to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power
knowledge gives. A popular government without popular
information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce
or a tragedy or perhaps both.72
The history of FOIA reflects that, indeed, Congress believed Section 3 of
the Administrative Procedure Act to be nothing better than "a farce or a
tragedy or perhaps both."
A. Legislative History
In the words of the Committee on Government Operations in passing Senate
Bill 1160 of the Eighty-ninth Congress, "The present statute... is not in any
realistic sense a public information statute., 7' That bill, Public Law 89-487,
68. Id. at 15-16 ("There is simply no support for the exemption in the statutory text, which
we have elsewhere insisted be read strictly in order to serve FOIA's mandate of broad
disclosure.").
69. Id. at 16 n.7 ("[T]hese proposals confirm the commonsense reading that we give
Exemption 5 today, as well as to emphasize that nobody in the Federal Government should be
surprised by this reading.").
70. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418; S. REP.
No. 89-813 (1965), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/foialeghistory/egistfoia.
htm.
71. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 23, as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2419.
72. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 37-38.
73. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 26, as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2422.
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would later be incorporated into FOIA via a 1967 amendment74 and is
therefore illustrative of congressional intent regarding FOIA. The push for
greater public access to government information began in 1953 with a study
responding to the growing concern about government secrecy that was
published by the American Society of Newspaper Editors." The author of the
study identified three areas in which legislative inaction had contributed to
"the weed of improper secrecy."7 6 The third of these was the target of the
modem-day Freedom of Information Act: Section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act."
One primary concern that prompted change was the ease under FOIA's
predecessor of withholding information from the public, thanks at least in part
to broad statutory exemptions. "Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure
Act . . . though titled 'Public Information' and clearly intended for that

purpose, has been used as authority for withholding, rather than disclosing
information. Such a 180 [degree] turn was easy to accomplish given the broad
language [of the Act]." 8 FOIA's predecessor had "become the major statutory
excuse for withholding Government records from public view."79 The Act was
seen as being too lenient - information could be withheld if it were "in the
public interest," "for good cause shown," or "if the records relate 'solely to the
internal management of an agency."'' s The Act also restricted who could
access government information by limiting that access to "'persons properly
and directly concerned"' with the records.8 Congress recognized that the
broad exemptions contained in Section 3 of the Administrative Procedures Act
were ripe for abuse and that it had been abused during the administrations of
Republicans and Democrats alike.82 One example offered by the Committee
on Government Operations was that in 1962 the National Science Foundation
"decided it would not be 'in the public interest' to disclose cost estimates
submitted by unsuccessful contractors in connection with a multimillion-dollar
deep sea study." 3 The winning contractor, it turns out, had not submitted the

74. 5 U.S.C. § 552 note (2000) (1967 Act) (" Section I [of Pub. L. 90-23] amends section
552 of title 5, United States Code, to reflect Public Law 89-487.").
75. H.R REp. No. 89-1497, at 23, as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2419.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.at 25, as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2421.
79. Id.at 24, as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2420.
80. Id.at 26, as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2422.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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lowest bid.' And, in 1961 the Secretary of the Navy withheld telephone
books under the exemption for documents related to the "internal
management" of an agency. 5 The Act was also used to prevent the disclosure
of employee names and salaries.16 Lastly, Congress found that the government
had used the "good cause" language to exclude from public scrutiny mistakes
by agencies and to exclude from disclosure records of votes by regulatory
boards and commissions.8 7 FOIA was passed to erase the vague language that
permitted these abuses.88 FOLA replaced broad exceptions "with specific and
limited types of information that may be withheld."' 9 Just as important was
the deletion of the restriction on who could request records - specifically
allowing access by the public. "For the great majority of different records, the
public as a whole has a right to know what its Government is doing," the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary reasoned. 90 The Judiciary Committee said
that the amendments would "establish a much-needed policy of disclosure,
while balancing the necessary interests of confidentiality."'
The courts have not lost sight of the purposes of FOIA expressed in the
Act's legislative history. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
"Congress 'was principally interested in opening administrative processes to
the scrutiny of the press and general public when it passed [FOIA]."' 92 The
Supreme Court also recognized FOIA mandates disclosure absent a clear
statutory exemption. 93 In EPA v. Mink,94 the Supreme Court said that FOIA
aims to grant access to information that had been unnecessarily hidden from
public view, and that the Act "attempts to create ajudicially enforceable public
' In balancing
right to secure... information from possibly unwilling hands."95
public versus private interests in FOIA cases, the Supreme Court has said that
"the only relevant 'public interest in disclosure' to be weighed... is the extent
to which disclosure would serve the 'core purpose of FOIA,' which is
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 27, as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2423.

87. Id.
88. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 40 (1965), availableat http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/
foialeghistory/legistfoia.htm.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 45.
92. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 17 (1974) (quoting
Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 466 F.2d 345, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
93. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-361 (1976).
94. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).

95. Id. at 80.
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'contribut[ing] significantly to public understanding of the operations or
activities of the government."'9 The Court went on to say that "official
information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties
falls squarely within that statutory purpose" of informing the public "about
what their government is up to."' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recognized that "disclosure of material in government files has now
become the rule, not the exception." ' The Stokes court also stated that FOIA's
intent was to "increase public access to such records by the imposition of
liberal disclosure requirements limited only by specific, narrowly construed
exemptions."" The Klamath Water Users court recognized that the policy
beyond FOIA was disclosure, not government secrecy." °
B. Exemptions
Recognizing there are instances in which nondisclosure does not violate the
policy of FOIA, Congress included nine exemptions in the Act. Unless one of
the exemptions applies, disclosure is required.'0 ' Courts have construed these
exemptions narrowly to favor disclosure in furtherance of the policy behind
102
FOIA.

The exemptions include the following:
(1) Matters that are classified under an executive order; (2) internal
personnel rules and practices; (3) matters that are exempt under another
statute; (4) trade secrets and other privileged or confidential financial
information that has been obtained from an individual; (5) inter- or intraagency memorandums or letters; (6) personnel and medical files or other files
whose disclosure would amount to an invasion of privacy; (7) law enforcement
records under six specific situations; (8) certain reports and information from
agencies that regulate or supervise financial institutions; and (9) geological and

96. U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 495 (1994)
(quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,775
(1989)).
97. FLRA, 510 U.S. at 495-96.
98. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1973).
99. Id.at 701.

100. U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8
(2001) (citing Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)).
101. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 150-51 (1989).
102. Id.
at 151 ("Consistent with the Act's goal of broad disclosure, these exemptions have
been consistently given a narrow compass."); Rose, 425 U.S. at 361 ("But these limited
exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant
objective of the Act.").
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geophysical information about wells. 3 The fifth exemption, that for inter- or
intra-agency documents, was at issue in Klamath Water Users.
1. Exemption 5: Inter- and Intra-agency Communications
Exemption 5 is aimed at protecting the agency decision-making process.
The exemption protects from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other
than an agency in litigation with the agency."' 1 4 FOIA defines "agency" as
"each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency."' ' The belief is that a "full and
frank exchange of opinions would be impossible if all internal communications
were made public."'" Congress, in discussions about the exemption, said that
a "Government agency cannot always operate effectively if it is required to
disclose documents or information which it has received or generated before
it completes the process of awarding a contract or issuing an order, decision
or regulation."'0 7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has said that Exemption 5 "was intended to encourage the free
exchange of ideas during the process of deliberation and policymaking;
accordingly, it has been held to protect internal communications consisting
of ... material reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes, but not
purely factual or investigatory reports."'0 8 In line with the policy behind the
exemption, the Klamath Water Users court recognized the possibility that not
protecting tribal-federal communications from disclosure could impact the
quality of communications between tribes and the federal government.'"
Exemption 5 has been construed narrowly, despite early concerns about the
potential breadth and possible abuse it could carry. Not long after its passage,
Exemption 5 was described as "potentially the most far-reaching" exemption
in that "on its face, an exemption for intra-agency memoranda can encompass
nearly anything an agency puts in writing.""' However, courts have more

103. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2000).
104. Id. § 552(b)(5).
105. Id. § 551(1).
106. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 31 (1966), as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2427.
107. Id.
108. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
109. Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 11 ("Nor is there any doubt about the plausibility of
the Government's assertion that the candor of tribal communications with the Bureau would be
eroded without the protections ofthe deliberative process privilege recognized under Exemption

5.").
110. Harvard Law Review Association, The FreedomoflnformationAct and the Exemption
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narrowly construed the exemption, specifically in relation to the requirement
that the information be unavailable to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the holding agency. The Supreme Court has interpreted this condition to
mean "those documents, and only those documents, normally privileged in the
civil discovery context."''. Put another way, the statute's "language clearly
contemplates that the public is entitled to all such memoranda or letters that a
private party could discover in litigation with the agency."" 2 The categories
of documents that are protected by Exemption 5 include those covered by the
deliberative process privilege, the attorney work-product privilege, and the
attorney-client privilege.'
But, courts could find that additional privileges
apply, as "the Supreme Court has indicated that Exemption 5 may incorporate
virtually all civil discovery privileges.""'
The deliberative process privilege is based on three policy considerations.
The privilege is intended to "to encourage open, frank discussions on matters
of policy" within the agency, to prevent the release of proposed policies before
adoption, and to prevent "confusion that might result from disclosure of
reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately the grounds for an
agency's action."'' Courts have attached to the deliberative process privilege
two requirements: (1) "the communication must be predecisional," and (2) "the
communication must be deliberative.""' 6
The attorney work-product privilege "protects documents and other
memoranda prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation."'1 7 This
privilege aims to "protect the adversarial trial process by insulating the
attorney's preparation from scrutiny." ' For the privilege to attach, "litigation
need never actually [commence], so long as specific claims have been
' 9
identified which make litigation probable." "

for Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1047, 1048-49 (1973).
111. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975).
112. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85 (1973).
113. 1 GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY AcTs 1-258, 1-278,
1-288 (Justin D. Franklin & Robert F. Bouchard eds., 2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK].
114. Id. at 1-291.
115. Id. at 1-258.
116. Id. at 1-259 to 1-260.
117. Id. at 1-278.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1-279.
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The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure those "confidential
communications between an attorney and his client relating to a legal matter
2
for which the client has sought professional advice."'o
Although some documents will clearly be inter- or intra-agency in that they
were produced within the agency or another agency, a wrinkle in Exemption
5 jurisprudence is found when outside consultants are used by a government
agency. In Soucie v. David, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit addressed the idea of an outside consultant being covered by
FOIA's Exemption 5."' In Soucie, two citizens sought access to documents
produced by outside experts related to the Office of Science and Technology's
examination of the government's development of a supersonic transport
aircraft. 22 After first determining that the Office was an agency under FOIA2 3
and that the review of the aircraft development was within its purpose, 24 the
D.C. Circuit said "consequently, any report prepared by the agency or its
consultants in fulfillment of that function must be regarded as a record of the
agency."' 25 The D.C. Circuit did not reach the ultimate question regarding
whether the documents at issue in Soucie were exempt from disclosure,
however, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 2 6 The
Supreme Court refused in Klamath Water Users to address whether reports of
outside consultants are covered by the exemption.2 7
2. ProposedIndian Amendments
At least twice, Congress has considered legislation that would protect from
disclosure documents that were the product of the federal-tribal relationship.2 8
The attempts came two years apart, first in 1976 and again in 1978.
In 1976, Congress contemplated amending FOIA to add an exemption for
"information held by a Federal agency as trustee, regarding the natural

120. Id. at 1-288 (quoting Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d
242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
121. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
122. Id. at 1069.
123. Id.at 1075.
124. Id. at 1075-76.
125. Id. at 1076.

126. Id. at 1080.
127. U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 12
(2001) ("Once the intra-agency condition is applied, it rules out any application of Exemption
5 to tribal communications on analogy to consultants' reports (assuming, which the Court does
not decide, that these reports may qualify as intra-agency under Exemption 5).").
128. Id. at 16 n.7.
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resources or other assets of Indian tribes or bands or groups or individual
members thereof."' 29
In his opening statements before the Senate
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, of the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota said tribal leaders had
expressed concern that FOIA "has in several instances served to work against
the best interests of the Indian community."' 3 These situations occur,
according to Senator Abourezk, when third parties seek the release of
information related to Indian natural resources.'' Such third-party requests,
according to Senator Abourezk, places the Department "in the anomalous
position by the Freedom of Information Act of being forced to violate its
fiduciary relationship with the tribes."'3 2 The proposed amendment, Senator
Abourezk said, "would resolve the dilemma of the Indians and their trustee by
exempting information concerning the natural resources and assets of tribes
from the Freedom of Information Act."' 33
The second attempt at protecting documents passed between tribes and the
federal government came in 1978 when Senator Abourezk introduced the
Indian Trust Information Protection Act. 4 The bill, if passed, would have
prohibited "the release of any information held, obtained, or prepared by the
Federal Government in the discharge of its Federal trust responsibility to the
Indian people," subject to eight exemptions. ,' Although the bill was referred
to the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs in March 1978, no further
action was taken.' 36
IV. Federal-TribalRelationship
The relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes has a
long and winding history. The relationship has been described as a
"guardianship, as a guardian-ward relationship, as a fiduciary or special

129. HearingBefore the Subcomm. on IndianAffairs of the Comm. on InteriorandInsular
Affairs, U.S. Senate, on S. 2652,94th Cong., at4 (1976), availableat http://www.loc.gov/law/
find/hearings/pdf700143459937.pdf [hereinafter Hearingon S. 2652].
130. Id. at 1.
131. Id.
132. Id.at 2.
133. Id.
134. Indian Trust Information Protection Act, S. 2773, 95th Cong. (2d Sess. 1978), http://
thomas.loc.gov/bss/d095query.html (by searching for "Indian Trust Information Protection
Act").
135. Id.
136. Id.
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relationship, or as a trust responsibility."' 37 This relationship was first
described by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1831 with Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 3 s an opinion authored by Chief Justice Marshall. 39 Marshall wrote
that Indian tribes were not foreign nations, but, rather, "domestic dependent
nations."'O Marshall continued, writing that tribes were in a "state of
pupilage" and that their relationship with the federal government resembled
that of a guardian and ward. 4 ' Some fifty years after Cherokee Nation, the
Court decided UnitedStates v. Kagama, in which it upheld a challenge to the
Major Crimes Act.'42 Kagama has since been credited for the creation of the
plenary power doctrine, which has been used to "justify nearly total federal
authority over tribal lands and internal tribal governance."' 43 For years the
trust relationship was used as a shield of abuse by the federal government,
rather than as a tool to protect tribal interests.' By the end of the twentieth
century, however, the trust doctrine had developed into a congressional
restraint, with "nearly every piece of modern legislation dealing with Indian
tribes [containing] a statement reaffirming the trust relationship between tribes
and the federal government."' 4 5 The trust relationship has evolved into "one
of the cornerstones of Indian law." 1"
By 1942, the Supreme Court had described the relationship as one requiring
"the most exacting fiduciary standards."' 147 However, executive actions
regarding Indians have been judged at a higher standard than congressional
137. Reid Peyton Chambers, JudicialEnforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1213-14 (1975).
138. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 30 U.S. (1. Pet.) 1 (1831).
139. Chambers, supra note 137, at 1215-16.
140. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (1. Pet.) at 17.
141. Id. ("They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power;
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father.").
142. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886). See generally 18 U.S.C. 1153
(2000).
143. Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise ofNative Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1502.
144. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 420 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2005) [hereinafter COHEN] ("The trust relationship served to bolster the exercise of a power that
would be constitutionally suspect based solely on the enumerated powers of Congress, and
served to immunize the United States from suit challenging these actions.") [hereinafter
COHEN]; Wood, supra note 143, at 1472 ("But while touted as a cornerstone of Indian law, the
doctrine frequently has allowed subordination of Indian interests to the whims of the federal
government.").
145. COHEN, supra note 144, at 420-2 1.
146. Id.at419.
147. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
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action. 4 ' One explanation for this is that courts have viewed Congress' trust
responsibility as largely a moral obligation "without justiciable standards for
its enforcement."' 49 Despite this, violations of the trust relationship by the
executive or Congress can result in "equitable, declaratory, or mandamus relief
in a federal district court.., or in a suit seeking damages in the United States
Claims Court."' ° It should be noted, however, that "the trust responsibility
has never served as the basis of a judicial order forcing Congress to act or
invalidating congressional action otherwise lawfully taken."'' Duties owed
by the government under the trust responsibility are commonly derived from
statutes or regulations, so "it is rare that a decision is based solely on the
general trust relationship between the federal government and Indians tribes,
but courts have asserted that the common-law trust relationship can be the
basis for a claim for specific relief."' 2 If a plaintiff can establish that there is
an actionable claim for breach of trust, courts have used the general law of
trusts "to determine the extent of the government's duties."' 53
This trust relationship was not lost on the Klamath Water Users court,
however, as it noted that "the existence of a trust obligation is not, of course,
in question."''
The Court went on to say that the relationship "has been
compared to one existing under a common law trust, with the United States as
trustee, the Indian tribes or individuals as beneficiaries, and the property and
natural resources.., as the trust corpus."' 55
V Analysis
The Klamath Water Users decision is sound for several reasons, including
the manner in which it upholds the preference under FOIA for government
disclosure while also helping tribal members hold the U.S. government
accountable for its actions under the trust relationship. FOIA was passed to
combat a growing secrecy problem with its predecessor, Section 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act.'5 6 FOIA's aim is broad disclosure, absent the
148. Chambers, supranote 137, at 1230 ("Cases... have placed tighter fiduciary restrictions
on the power of executive officials over Indian property than those imposed on Congress.").
149. Id.at 1227.
150. Wood, supra note 143, at 1514-15.
151. CoHEN, supra note 144, at 423.

152. Id.
at 425-26.
153. Id.at 433.
154. U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 11

(2001).
155. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983)).
156. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 22 (1966), as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418,
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presence of one of the nine enumerated exemptions.' Even if one of the nine
exemptions could apply, the exemptions must be construed narrowly to further
To this end, the Klamath Water Users
the preference for broad disclosure.'
court developed a two-pronged approach to claimed Exemption 5 information
- first, the "communication must be 'inter-agency or intra-agency,""" and,
second, the communication "must fall within the ambit of a privilege against
discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the
agency that holds it."" A plain reading of the statute would make this holding
make sense - especially after a reading of the definition of "agency"
contained within FOIA. "Agency" is defined by statute as "each authority of
the Government of the United State, whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency."'' This holding helps make certain that FOIAcovered documents are not hidden behind Exemption 5 without cause by the
use of simple, conclusory statements that documents are covered. Of course,
as the Court recognized, some appellate courts have approved the use of
Exemption 5 when outside consultants provide documents to agencies.'6 2 In
distinguishing away those cases, by looking to the intent and interest of the
third-party outside consultant, the Court seems to have a solid argument. In
the instance of outside experts hired by the agency holding the records, it
makes sense to allow their documents to be covered - they are simply an arm
of the agency acting for the interests of the agency. "[The expert's] only
obligations are to truth and its sense of what good judgment calls for, and in
those respects the consultant functions just as an employee would be expected
to do."' 63 In the case of Indian tribes communicating about water claims, the
tribe is not concerned about the agency's interests, but, as the Court noted,
they are "self-advocates at the expense of others seeking benefits inadequate
to satisfy everyone."'" Protecting such communications by extending the
outside consultant line of cases could shield from public scrutiny corruption

2418.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976).
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 150-51 (1989).
Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 9.
Id. at 8.

161. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000).
162. Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 9 ("Although neither the terms of the exemption nor
the statutory definitions say anything about communications with outsiders, some Courts of
Appeals have held that in some circumstances a document prepared outside the Government
may nevertheless qualify as an 'intra-agency' memorandum under Exemption 5.").
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id. at 12.
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within the agency, or worse, a failure by the agency to live up to its trust
obligations. Keeping these communications open allows tribal members and
nonmembers alike to scrutinize the Department and the BIA in their dealings
with Indian tribes.
A perfect example of how this ruling could help tribes rather than hurt them
is seen in Seminole Nation v. United States.165 In that case, the federal
government had agreed by treaty in 1856 to establish a $500,000 trust fund,
with the annual interest of $25,000 to be paid directly to individual members
of the Seminole Nation.166 However, from 1870 to 1874, the federal
government failed to make these payments, albeit at the request of the tribal
council. 167 The council requested that payments be made to the tribe's
treasurer and creditors. 168 Theoretically, if a similar misdeed took place today,
a FOIA-savvy tribal member who missed an expected annual payment could,
under the holding in Klamath Water Users, discover that the tribal council had
requested the change and that the United States had failed in its role to
safeguard individual tribal members' interests. This holding serves the "'core
purpose of FOIA,' which is 'contribut[ing] significantly to public
understanding of the operations or activities of the government.'" 69 Certainly
the government's treaty obligations "fall squarely within that statutory
170
purpose" of informing the public "about what their government is up to.'
Klamath Water Users is not unique in holding that documents passing
between Indian tribes and federal agencies are not covered by FOIA's
Exemption 5. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the issue
in the early 1980s when attorneys for two New York counties sought
documents sent by a tribe's counsel to the Department of Justice regarding
settlement negotiations.171 In Madison County v. U.S. Departmentof Justice,
the parties were involved in two separate land-claims cases involving the
Oneida Indian Nation.'72 The first was filed by the Oneidas against the United
States in the Court of Claims, while the second was filed by the tribe against
New York's Oneida and Madison counties in federal district court. 73 The

165. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
166. Id.at 294.
167. Id.at 294-95.

168. Id.
169. U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 495 (1994)
(internal citations omitted).
170. FLRA, 510U.S. at495.
171. Madison County v.U.S. Dep't of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036 (1st Cir. 1981).
172. Id.at 1038.
173. Id.
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Oneidas and federal government had entered into settlement negotiations, but
the tribe was apprehensive about settling the case because of fears that such an
agreement would adversely affect its claims against the counties.' 74 Upon
learning of these discussions, the counties' attorney filed a FOIA request so
that he could "be provided with all documents relating to this tentative Court
of Claims case settlement."' 75 The district court found that the documents
passing from tribal attorneys to the Department of Justice were not covered by
Exemption 5.76 The district court also found that although correspondence
from the Department of Justice to the tribal attorneys did not fit Exemption 5,
"the public policy encouraging nonlitigious solutions of disputes ...and the
necessary candor that such a process contemplates militates against disclosure
of these records.' 77 This public policy reasoning was rejected by the First
Circuit, as was the reasoning that the tribe served as an outside consultant to
the Department of Justice. 7 1 The court wrote that it felt that it must be certain
that even appealing policy arguments be "grounded in a reading of statutory
language that fairly reconciles rather than simply ignores the FOIA's
phrasing.' 79 The court went on to say, "We perceive of no way, however, to
describe the Oneida's lawyers as 'intra-agency' that is to say 'within the
Department of Justice' that does not simply omit the term 'intra-agency' from
the Act in pursuit of policy ends."' 80 Regarding the consultant argument, the
court distinguished the Madison County case by looking toward the interest of
the outside third party, saying that in previous cases "the agency contacted
nonpayroll individuals to obtain information for the benefit of the agency."''
But, much like in Klamath Water Users, the Oneidas "were past and potential
adversaries, not co-opted colleagues."'8 2 In other words, the Oneidas in
Madison County and the tribes in Klamath Water Users were in
communication with federal agencies to seek benefits for themselves, not for
the agency or federal government. To extend Exemption 5 to this scenario, the
Madison County court held, "would do more violence to statutory language
than Congress' direction permits."'8 This reasoning, which came twenty years

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id.
Id.at
Id.at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at

1039.
1040-41.
1040.

1041.
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before Klamath Water Users, is sound and nearly identical to the Court's
reasoning here.
The decision by the Court not to read into FOIA an Indian-trust
exemption" 9 seems to have followed congressional intent while also signaling
who to turn to for relief. This was a wise decision, as Congress has twice
considered legislation that would achieve this purpose, with both proposals
failing.'85 Although, as the Court points out, it is not common practice to
interpret statutes such as FOIA based on congressional inaction, it seemed
appropriate in this case because "these proposals confirm the commonsense
''86 This appears to be a
reading that we give Exemption 5."
camouflaged
indication to tribes and tribal advocates that there is a legislative solution to
this problem - lobby Congress for a specific "Indian trust" exemption. The
failed attempts at passing "Indian trust" exemptions indicate Congress
understands it can pass such amendments, but that it has chosen not to.
Anther potential approach the Court could have taken is seen in Great
Northern Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation. 87 In that case, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine decided a similar case, in which paper companies
188
sought documents from two tribes under the state's open records law.
Clearly there are differences in that GreatNorthern Paperwas a state case and
dealt with a state open records act. However, the reasoning is sound. Maine's
top court resolved the matter by concluding that the state's open records act
did not apply to internal tribal documents, however, the act did apply if the
Tribe was interacting with other governments or agencies while acting within
its municipal capacity."8 9 This appears to be a proper framework and its
reasoning is on par with that of the Supreme Court in Klamath Water Users.
FOIA, it seems, could never reach internal tribal documents. But, it makes
sense to extend FOIA to documents sent by tribes to the federal government
in their role as independent governmental entities. And, if the tribes are
viewed as such, they could not be considered agencies or true outside
consultants when acting in their governmental capacities.
From a strictly Indian law point of view, Klamath Water Users is
understandably problematic. As the Court in Klamath Water Users

184. U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 15-16

(2001).
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.at 16 n.7.
Id.
Great Northern Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation, 770 A.2d 574 (Maine 2004).
Id.at 577.
Id.
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acknowledged, the holding could erode the candor of tribal communications
with the federal government.'" But, again, that is where advocacy aimed
toward Congress would come into play. Klamath Water Users is obviously a
strictly FOIA-based decision with little consideration of the trust relationship
between tribes and the United States. Although private trust law principals
have been used to analyze how the government has performed its trustee
duties, "not every aspect of private trust law can properly govern the unique
relationship of tribes and the federal government."' 9' This appears to be one
of those cases. The Department of the Interior is constantly balancing its
duties to tribes and its duties to others.92 As Senior Judge Canby points out,
threats to the Department's efforts to protect trust assets come from various
offices and bureaus within the Department itself' 93 Although it would be
preferable from an Indian law and perhaps trust law standpoint that these
communications remain confidential, allowing public access to them, and
communications from other interested third parties who do not qualify as
outside consultants, will permit the public to determine if the Department is
living up to its duties to all concerned, or if it is ignoring its constituents. This,
again, would help fulfill the basic aim of FOIA to have a more transparent
government.
VI. Conclusion
The decision in Klamath Water Users upholds the core purpose of FOIA,
namely a more transparent government, while also giving tribal members the
power to monitor the government's actions under the trust relationship. The
decision also upholds the idea behind the nine enumerated exemptions to
FOIA's general mandate of disclosure by narrowly construing Exemption 5's
elements - primarily by following the statutory definition of "agency" and
refusing to expand it to self-interested third parties. Although it might be
preferable for documents traded between tribes and the federal government
under the trust relationship to remain confidential, the appropriate way to
achieve this is through legislative means - not by having the Supreme Court
read into FOIA such an exemption.

190. Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 11.
191. COHEN, supra note 144, at 434-35.
192.

CANBY, supra note 7,

at 49.

193. Id.
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